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Abstract: This paper examines shifting modalities of government over Bedouins of the 
Negev.  During the first two decades of statehood, Israeli officials approached Bedouins 
as a relatively quiescent population, based on their understanding that Bedouins’ tribal 
loyalties guaranteed their aloofness from Palestinian national politics.  From the 1970s on, 
however, Bedouin resistance to Israeli land and settlement policies began to mark the 
Bedouin increasingly as a “dangerous population.”  As a result, the interest in preserving 
Bedouins’ cultural specificity gave way to a new emphasis on the need to modernize the 
Bedouins.  The shift in governmental discourse was accompanied by a pluralization in the 
techniques of government, from an informal “government of experts” to one in which 
bureaucratic and impersonal modes of authority competed with expert rule. 




In a letter addressed in 1923 to Herbert Samuel, the first British High Commissioner in 
Palestine, a group of Bedouin sheikhs from Beit She’an Valley described themselves with the 
following words: 
We don’t meddle in politics, don’t attend rallies, and don’t send 
delegations.  We are simple people who live in tents and deal with 
our own affairs only.  We agree with everything the government 
does ... We have seen no evil from the Jews.  We have sold the 
American Jewish Agency some of our lands, and with the help of 
the money we received, we are developing and cultivating the 
large tracts that remain ours.  We are pleased with these Jews, and 
we are convinced that we will work together to improve our region 
and to pursue our common interests (quoted in Cohen 2008: 66). 
The letter was penned in the aftermath of the Balfour Declaration, a time of heightened conflict 
between the Arabs and Jews of Palestine.  The folkloric image Bedouins adopted for themselves 
of a “simple people who live in tents” and “don’t meddle in politics” would serve both Bedouin 
sheikhs and Zionists well during the pre-state period and the early years of the State of Israel.  
On the one hand, Bedouins’ relative aloofness from Palestinian national politics, and on the other 
hand, their tents, camels, and kafiye, the various expressions of their tribal heritage, combined to 
mark them off, in Jewish eyes, from the rest of the Palestinian population as a less dangerous 
population.  Zionist officials wholeheartedly embraced the image of a “simple people who live in 
tents” and, during the first two decades of statehood, developed particular practices and 
institutions for the government of Bedouins that prized Bedouin folklore.  Bedouins, in turn, 
were able to carve out a sphere, albeit a narrow one, in which they could negotiate with Israeli 
officials, unbridled by a commitment to Palestinian nationalism, and preserve a degree of 
internal autonomy.  By the 1970s and 1980s, however, the “folklorist” discourse, and the 
governmental practices and institutions behind it, had lost ground to a novel discourse that 
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stressed the imperative to modernize Bedouins.  For their part, the Bedouins were no longer so 
“pleased” with the Jews, nor wanted to sell land to them anymore. 
This paper traces the shifts in Israeli discourse, practices, and institutions from a 
“folkloric paradigm” that prized Bedouin tribal culture to a “modernization paradigm” that 
encourages state-induced modernization of the Bedouin.   The localized commitments of 
Bedouins to their lineage, which identified them as a relatively quiescent population early on, 
shaped a particularly Bedouin style of resistance to Israeli policies during the 1970s, I argue, and 
began to mark the Bedouin increasingly as a “dangerous population.”  The primary, though not 
exclusive, dynamic that strained the Israeli-Bedouin relationship from the 1970s on was the 
incompatible ways in which the Israeli government and Bedouins envisioned the spatial and 
demographic organization of the Negev.  Israel’s attempt to reserve the Negev lands for Jewish 
settlement by relocating Bedouins into all-Bedouin urban settlements clashed with Bedouins’ 
claims of ownership over the lands they regarded as their ancestral territory.  The imbroglio over 
land and settlement did much to damage the esteem in which Israeli officials held Bedouin 
folklore and tradition.  The shift in official discourse from folklore to modernization was 
accompanied, I claim, by a pluralization in the techniques of government, from one that relied 
exclusively on a “government of experts,” characterized by bilateral interactions between 
Bedouin sheikhs and Israeli intelligence officers, to one in which “expert rule” was overtaken by 
bureaucratic and impersonal modes of authority in which the experts lost their previous 
monopoly over Bedouin affairs. 
In what follows, I first describe the institutional incorporation of Bedouins into the Israeli 
polity through the government of experts in the initial era of state building.  I focus on law 
enforcement in the Negev as a particular form of expert government in which Israeli officials 
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developed a system of joint governance with Bedouin sheikhs. Next, I examine the resurgence of 
conflict over the question of land ownership after the end of the military era, and how Bedouins’ 
particular style of resistance to Israel’s land policy led to a new perception of Bedouins as a 
dangerous population.  This discussion is followed by an examination of the changing 
institutional apparatus for governing the Bedouin, from one that relied on face-to-face 
interactions between the sheikhs and Israeli experts to one in which bureaucratic agencies were 
mobilized to modernize and urbanize the Bedouin.  The paper draws on interviews conducted in 
2006 with current and retired Bedouin experts employed by the police and archival research on 
honor killing cases in the District Courts of Be’er Sheva and Nazareth. 
Cultivating Bedouin Tribalism, 1948-1966 
When the Israeli Army occupied the Negev at the end of 1948, around 80 percent of the 
Bedouin population, which had numbered between 55,000 and 65,000 during the British 
Mandate, either fled across the border or were expelled by the Egyptian and Israeli armies.  After 
the war, some of those who had left during the war returned and registered as Israeli citizens, and 
others remained on the other side of the border in Egypt, Gaza, and the West Bank.  In 1953, 
about 11,000 Bedouin remained in the Negev (Marx 1967: 12).  Although Bedouins participated 
to a very limited extent in the Arab-Israeli War of 1947-1949, all the Bedouin who remained 
within the borders of the new state were placed under Military Administration, and removed to 
an Enclosure Zone east of the city of Be’er Sheva in 1953 (Marx 1967: 14; Shamir 1996: 232).  
Movement in and out of the Enclosure Zone was subject to permission from the military 
authorities, who exercised their powers more extensively in the Negev than other Palestinian 
zones under military rule, and severely restricted the mobility of this previously semi-nomadic 
population (Marx 1967: 38). 
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While what remained of Negev’s Bedouin population was immobilized in the Enclosure 
Zone, the Israeli government began registering their land as state property, based on the Ottoman 
classification of mawat land—dead, uncultivated land—and the Israeli classification of “absentee 
property.”  According to the Ottoman Land Law of 1858, land that was not cultivated or owned 
by anyone would be classified as mawat.  The Land Rights Settlement Ordinance of 1969, in turn, 
announced that lands classified as mawat under the Ottoman Code would be registered as state 
property unless a formal legal title was provided (Greenspan 2005: 75; Yiftachel 2006: 198; 
Shamir 1996).  The Land Acquisition Law of 1953 declared that “absentee property,” that is, 
land not in the possession of its owner by April 1, 1952, would be registered as state property 
(Greenspan 2005: 75) and that the state could also confiscate private lands for compelling state 
interests, such as security and settlement (Falah 1989: 79).  Like other Palestinians, many 
Bedouins were not found in their original dwelling places by the April 1 deadline.  All of the 
land that belonged to the eleven tribes that were transferred to the Enclosure Zone was taken 
over by the Israeli government (Falah 1989: 79) and most of these lands were then distributed to 
Jewish settlements for new immigrants (Yiftachel 2006: 198).  When military rule was abolished 
in 1966 and Bedouins began to return to their lands, the legal context of ownership had been 
profoundly altered. 
During the military period, Israeli officials also developed a set of formal and informal 
practices geared particularly for the government of the Bedouin population.  The institutional 
framework that developed was inspired by the perception that Bedouins constituted a separate—
and less dangerous—group from the rest of the Arab community.  This perception, in turn, rested 
on Bedouins’ low level participation in Arab-Israeli fighting during 1948-1949 (Marx 1967: 34-
35).  Some Bedouins actively cooperated with the Jews in the Minorities Unit of the Israeli 
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Defense Forces (IDF) headed by Tuvia Lishansky, which included 400 Druze, 200 Bedouin, and 
100 Circassians (Firro 1999: 57).  After the war, some tribal leaders who remained in the Negev 
signed agreements with the IDF to guarantee fair treatment in exchange for loyalty and 
cooperation (Meir 1997: 65).   Although military conscription was not made compulsory for 
Bedouins after the establishment of the state, as it was made for the Druze in 1956 (Firro 1999: 
127) and for the Circassians in 1958 (Krebs 2006: 213), Bedouins have continued to volunteer in 
the IDF after the establishment of Israel.  To this day, Bedouins’ willingness to participate in the 
IDF marks them off from Christian and other Muslim Palestinians.  As one officer specializing 
on Bedouin affairs remarked, “If you compare [the Bedouins] to other tribes or minorities in the 
country, they are different because they have deep roots of acting together with representatives 
of government since the period of military rule.”1
The hallmark of Bedouins’ separate identity—and their precarious ticket to benign 
treatment by the Israeli government—was their tribal culture.  The form of government that 
emerged in the Negev was accordingly one in which Israeli officials sought to preserve the tribal 
structure and elevated Bedouin culture to an object of specialized knowledge.  What emerged 
was a “government of experts,” characterized by informal interactions between Bedouin sheikhs 
and Israeli experts well-versed in “Bedouin culture.”  The experts maintained informal ties with 
Bedouin sheikhs, selectively distributing rewards to maintain inter-tribal competition and intra-
tribal compliance, while also collecting intelligence on the internal affairs of the Bedouin.  This 
institutional framework was a crucial component of the government’s policy of isolating the 
Bedouins from the rest of the Palestinian population in order to offset the emergence of a 
Palestinian national movement (Lustick 1980: 134; Yonah et al 2004: 65).  The “experts” 
coordinated their activities through the Office of Adviser on Arab Affairs, the Shin Bet, and the 
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Military Administration.  The spatial control of the Arab population through the permit system 
and the dominance of intelligence agencies—the Shin Bet, the Military Administration, and the 
special departments devoted to the affairs of the Arab minority—generated a form of 
government that was highly coordinated and specialized. 
Like all tribal peoples, Bedouins were “illegible” to government authorities to some 
extent.  Their lack of commitment to a specific location, uncontrolled movements, mysterious 
loyalties and rivalries, the essentially oral nature of their legal understandings with one another, 
and their historic suspicion of central governments posed administrative challenges for the new 
state.  A retired officer remarked that this “illegibility” made it incumbent on the administration 
to develop special expertise: “No one knows how many Bedouin there are.  They don’t cooperate 
or register.  Part of their tradition is to suspect foreign officials.  British, Ottoman, Israeli. In their 
epistemology, they are suspicious.  That’s why the police have to be very specialized.  In this 
suspicious society, we have to develop experts because it’s very hard to work with them.  You 
need very good intelligence.”2  Expertise often meant intelligence and the two modes of 
knowledge were not distinguishable from each other.  In order to carry out various policies, the 
government needed intelligence on the internal rivalries and divisions of Bedouin tribes.  One 
senior officer remarked, “We identify the dominant groups by looking at the roles they fulfill. 
When we move to an area, we can evaluate the role and influence of the person who approaches 
us. We have strong intelligence, we know who is strong. We also know their rivalries with each 
other.”3  Such divisions enabled the government to induce cooperation by deciding who could be 
a sheikh, who would be registered under which tribe, which tribes would have access to 
resources, and in general, develop alliances with which to carry out policies when certain sectors 
of the population did not cooperate with the government. 
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After relocating the Bedouins in the Enclosure Zone, the government officially 
recognized nineteen chiefs as representatives of their tribes (Marx 1967: 12).  Every Bedouin had 
to have a tribal affiliation, which would be entered in his identity card (Marx 1967: 40).  Fifteen 
of these chiefs were appointed as mukhtars, the official representatives of their villages, by the 
Ministry of Interior (Marx 1967: 44).  The practice of officially recognizing sheikhs and 
registering them with the Ministry of Interior continued at least until the early 2000s,4
Legal Pluralism and Expert Government 
 and the 
number of officially recognized tribes increased from nineteen in 1953 to forty-eight in the early 
1990s (Meir 1997: 94).  During the military period, scarce resources, such as movement permits, 
rationed foodstuffs, tractor permits, land leases, and compensation to farmers who suffered the 
consequences of the 1957-1958 drought were allocated through the recognized chiefs, often on 
the basis of their loyalty to Israel (Marx 1967: 41-45).  Only chiefs were allowed to open shops 
when licenses for shops were being distributed by the military government.  The distribution of 
resources through tribal sheikhs occasionally led to violent conflicts between tribes, when one 
group splintered from another to seek independent tribal status with the government (Ginat 1997: 
27).  Such rivalries provided government officials with additional leverage.  The incorporation of 
Bedouins into the Israeli polity occurred, then, through the bilateral relations of Jewish experts-
cum-intelligence officers and Bedouin sheikhs.  This style of government, in turn, reformulated 
the authority of sheikhs over their kinsmen while changing the basis of this authority, and created 
a space within which Bedouin leaders could strike informal bargains with Israeli officials on 
matters of everyday concern. 
Apart from holding the reins of scarce resources, the experts governed Bedouin society 
through a particular form of legal pluralism in the Negev, informally recognizing the partial 
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autonomy of Bedouin law, on the one hand, and immersing themselves in local dispute 
resolution processes as guests, arbitrators, and guardians of the state’s law, on the other.  Before 
examining the style of pluralism that emerged under Israeli rule, a brief overview of Bedouin law 
under the Ottoman Empire and British rule will be helpful. 
Under the Ottoman Empire, the Bedouins of the Negev enjoyed a wide degree of de facto 
autonomy, as did other tribal peoples of the empire.  Officially, tribal law was not recognized by 
the Ottoman Empire.  Rather, a qadi (judge) was appointed to every administrative district to 
apply both the Islamic Shari’a law and Ottoman legislation.  However, as an agricultural empire 
before the age of nation-states, the Ottoman Empire had no interest, nor the resources to regulate, 
the everyday affairs of the populations under its jurisdiction, particularly those in distant areas.  
Furthermore, there were no urban centers in the Negev area—nor a Shari’a court—until the 
establishment of the city of Be’er Sheva in 1900 (Abu-Rabi’a 2001: 11-12).  Hence, in their 
dealings with one another, Bedouins enjoyed a wide degree of de facto autonomy, and informal 
tribal law, administered by Bedouin sheikhs, was the dominant “living law” of the community. 
The British Mandate brought in a different mode of regulating local law, based on models 
of pluralism developed in the British colonies during the previous century.  In 1919, the British 
authorities established a “Blood Council” composed of the sheikhs of the five leading tribes to 
adjudicate blood disputes among the Bedouin.  The council settled over 150 blood disputes and 
ransom cases during the three years of its existence (Abu-Rabi’a 2001: 34).  In 1922, the Blood 
Council was replaced by a tribal court in the city of Be’er Sheva that would apply “tribal custom, 
so far as it is not repugnant to natural justice or morality” (Likhovski 2006: 33), and sixteen 
Bedouin sheikhs were appointed as its judges (Abu-Rabi’a 2001: 33).  The jurisdiction of the 
tribal court was limited to small criminal and civil disputes, and the consent of the district officer 
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of Beersheba was necessary for a case to be accepted by the Court.  Field officers preferred 
greater jurisdiction to the tribal court, for in the words of one official, the official courts “[carry] 
no weight with the tribes however severe the punishment inflicted” (Likhovski 2006: 42).  
Officers in Jerusalem, however, opposed granting greater authority to the tribal court.  As 
elsewhere in colonial settings, the state-established tribal court was neither fully autonomous, nor 
fully authentic.  Rather, the colonial government reconstructed tradition by determining what 
aspects of the tradition would continue and what aspects of it would be suppressed.  For example, 
ordeal by fire (bish’a), already a rare occurrence by the 1930s, was identified as a repugnant 
custom and formally banned in 1941 (Likhovski 2006: 41).  The court’s application of 
“customary law” differed from the “living law” of the community because the judge’s rulings 
would be enforceable by the administration and the parties did not have to agree to the solution.  
The Be’er Sheva court also brought written procedures to an essentially oral legal order.  These 
procedural changes privileged rules over process and reduced the flexibility of Bedouin law, 
which traditionally rested on a process of lengthy negotiations and persuasion. 
Bedouins did not object to the establishment or the procedures of this state-tribal court, 
but they also did not make it their exclusive or even primary destination for resolving their 
grievances.  Unofficial dispute resolution by communally recognized sheikhs continued unabated 
and carried parallel jurisdiction to those of the new state-tribal court.  According to Likhovski, 
the number of unofficial courts reached 100 during the Mandate (Likhovski 2006: 35).  Bedouin 
sheikhs from Negev regularly met their counterparts in the Sinai and Jordan, furthermore, to 
resolve common problems, disregarding Britain’s attempts to institutionalize the borders of 
Palestine and refusing to submit their legal institutions to the new territorial logic that cut across 
their commitments to one another. 
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Israel did not continue the British practice of formally recognizing an autonomous 
Bedouin legal sphere, nor the Ottoman tradition of de facto recognition through non-intervention.  
As far as their formal legal incorporation was concerned, Bedouins were subsumed under the 
category of Muslims, subject to Shari’a courts in family law matters and to Israeli law in all other 
matters.  However, informally, Israeli officials operated with wide latitude in administering 
Israeli laws on the Bedouin.  The style of accommodation differed from Ottoman non-
interventionism and from Britain’s formal incorporation of a “tamed” customary law in that 
Israeli pluralism was highly interventionist and relied on extensive participation of Jewish 
experts in the informal legal proceedings of the Bedouin. 
Israeli officials did not want to displace the tribal structure of Bedouin society, which, as 
stated earlier, was seen as the primary condition of Bedouins’ non-dangerousness and of their 
continued cooperation with Israeli officers.  At the same time, the informal legal proceedings of 
the Bedouin, characterized by long debates between several sheikhs and the parties, provided a 
crucial site in which “open-source intelligence” could be obtained about disputes and ranks 
within the community.  One field officer who participated extensively in Bedouin dispute 
resolution forums explained his role with the following words: 
The importance of my job is to implement Israeli law in Bedouin 
society, because in societies like the Bedouin, when there are two 
systems of law, they tend to act by the one that is closer to them 
and they tend to fight back or resist state law.  So my job is, 
instead of making them obey Israeli law, I soften this conflict or 
intersection [between the two legal systems].  Instead of making it 
something violent…,of saying they are Israeli citizens and must 
obey Israeli law, I’m a representative of the state who softens [this 
conflict] and tries to do it in a more communicative way.5
From the officials’ point of view, the supremacy of Israeli law was not in question, nor was there 
a commitment to uproot Bedouin law.  The government acknowledged that Bedouins’ loyalties 
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lay elsewhere and did not expect them to behave like Israeli citizens.  Rather than trying to 
uproot Bedouin law, the officials saw their task as facilitating the coexistence of the two systems 
without conceding control over how this multiplicity would be managed, while also doing their 
best to win the hearts of Bedouins.  Jewish experts’ enthusiasm for participation in informal 
Bedouin forums reinvigorated the process of customary law—over rules—but ultimately it was 
up to the Israeli officials to endorse the rulings of the sheikhs.  Hence, Bedouin law was kept 
alive without functioning autonomously, and the informal proceedings provided a space within 
which Bedouins could limit the applicability of Israeli law in Bedouin affairs. 
Certain administrative routines developed over the years to govern the two systems of 
rule jointly.  Once a dispute or crime was under way, Israeli officials contacted the sheikhs with 
whom they maintained cordial relations and secured a place for themselves in the legal 
proceedings of the Bedouin, while also initiating proceedings at the official legal sphere.  “We 
go to the sheikhs, we don’t wait for them to come to us,” explained one officer.6  The official 
proceedings affected the internal process of the Bedouins by foreshadowing the balance of 
evidence and the possibilities of official sanctions.  Bedouin proceedings, in turn, affected the 
official proceedings by uncovering evidence.  As I explain below, once a solution was reached at 
the internal level, the sheikhs and the Israeli officials began to negotiate a compromise for the 
official level.  The internal solution would be given weight at the official level as mitigated 
punishment, the closing of a file, or the changing of a charge.  In response to a question on when 
these administrative patterns had developed, one senior officer replied “It’s always been.  It’s 
institutional memory.”7
In interviews, Bedouin experts employed by the police described these administrative 
routines.  One officer who worked in the Negev for over thirty-years remarked, “Sulha”
 
8 is an 
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old custom.  The police are forbidden to participate in this.  But, in indirect ways, police can get 
involved.  For example, [when] two families murder one another…  [our senior officers] will 
speak to the sheikhs to prevent the emergence of more problems.”9  Another officer stated, “Our 
principle is to intervene in all criminal cases. We make arrests, we collect evidence, start the 
court process early, although we’re aware that they’re running their own process at the same time. 
But we ignore that and pursue state law. Eventually, if the families reach agreement, our cases in 
court collapse.”10  A retired officer said, “With their ceasefire agreement, I release the people 
arrested.  That’s how the police plays a role in sulha. Then they make their own trial and we 
don’t interfere… So the police have an interest in encouraging internal dispute resolution.  It’s 
even worth closing files in return.  The police can play a constructive role, all under public 
interest.  Because the formal law is not a solution.”11  The officials sought to gain the backing of 
the sheikhs for the solutions they came up with, while also granting official sanctity to the 
solutions of the sheikhs: “This is an example of how police operations intersect with traditional 
tribal dispute resolution.  We bring it to such an extent that we ask the sheikhs to sign forms. 
Although it relies on tradition, the forms give it official backing.  The forms are otherwise of no 
value.  The idea is to give the weight of the state and the police behind traditional practice.12
At times, running the two parallel systems resulted in contradictions: “So the police can 
be in a situation where they press charges but then give instructions to the court not to press 
charges.”
 
13  A lower ranking officer in the Be’er Sheva station posed the dilemma as one 
between gathering intelligence and strict adherence to the rule of law: “We have to close our 
eyes to a lot of things we shouldn’t be closing our eyes to.  This is intelligence.  Everywhere it’s 
the same.  Information comes with a cost.”14  These compromises were seen as inevitable: 
“Sometimes, there’s a problem of trust [between the Bedouins], and then they may ask us to 
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mediate.  It’s absurd, because there’s also a criminal activity going on that we try to resolve.  I sit 
on a shig15 with two officers and I talk to a sheikh, trying to resolve the dispute, while my 
officers are searching for weapons three houses away.  Both we and them live with this 
duality.”16
These accommodations occurred at the local level, in the shigs of Bedouin sheikhs, or a 
private room in one of the police stations dotting the Negev.  They did not reach Jerusalem.  The 
Chair of the Pardon Committee located in the Ministry of Justice remarked, for instance, that the 
Druze and Arab-Israeli leaders, as well as Jewish Rabbis, routinely called her office and sent 
written petitions on behalf of the members of their communities, to mitigate a sentence or request 
pardon, but no Bedouin ever contacted her.
 
17  The Supreme Court of Israel also did not treat 
practices in which Bedouin law differed markedly from Israeli law—such as blood killings or 
honor killings—with leniency.  As early as 1955, the Supreme Court stated in a case originating 
in the Bedouin community that “if it were to be decided, even once, that a blood revenge is 
justified, or could even lower a murder charge to that of manslaughter, the land would be filled 
with avengers of blood and vigilantes.”  The Supreme Court was equally unwilling to recognize 
custom in the area of honor killings.  In 1994, in a case originating in Haifa, the Court stated, 
“As a concluding remark in this judgment, we consider it necessary to state that one should never 
expect that in the juridical system of Israel we will recognize the issue of family honor as an 
extenuating circumstance, which could result in mitigating the charge… We regard the deed of 
the defendant as an abhorrent and detestable act of murder to be punished with all the vigor of 
the Penal Law, that is—with nothing less than a life sentence” (quoted in Touma-Suleiman 2005: 
189, 191-2).18 
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At the local level, however, there was considerable accommodation and leniency, 
including reducing a murder charge to that of manslaughter, and in some cases, closing a file 
altogether.  Joseph Ginat, an anthropologist who worked in the Office of Advisor on Arab 
Affairs during its formative years and participated extensively in Bedouin disputes, argues that 
while judicial authorities adopted a zero-tolerance approach to Arab and Bedouin customs, 
administrative and executive agencies working with these communities developed more 
conciliatory approaches: 
In Israel, the state officials refuse to legitimize acts of violence in 
the course of blood disputes, yet officers of the state (high 
government and local officials, military and police officers, and 
public personalities), acting as official mediators [in disputes 
between Arabs], find themselves in an effort to contain or resolve 
blood disputes.  These people actually invest the authority of the 
state in a serious effort, on the border of legality, to reduce the 
damage incurred in blood disputes.  In some cases, the official 
mediators intercede with the legal authorities on behalf of the 
perpetrators.  This is not a violation of the law, nor a relaxation of 
its enforcement.  Officials simply tend, in these situations, to use 
their judgment to the limit of their legal authority… The partial 
recognition by the state of traditional customs may indeed 
contribute to their continuity.  But more probably the 
responsiveness it demonstrates limits the alienation of traditional 
communities within the modern state.  Furthermore, informal 
involvement with the members of the governing and social elite 
enhances the process of socialization of the more traditional 
members of Israeli society (Ginat 1987: 26-27). 
Ginat’s claim that administrative officials were more willing to reach compromises was 
supported in interviews with police officials and sheikhs.  A Bedouin sheikh from the town of 
Tel Sheva explained that if the close relations of a woman kill her and then bury her, no one 
would know about it.  He added, “The police don’t look for further evidence… Everything is 
closed at the police before the offence list is passed over to the court.”19  When asked if charges 
in honor murder cases can be negotiated in plea bargains, a police officer in the Be’er Sheva 
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station remarked that negotiations were reached before the case reaches the court.20
In sum, although Bedouin law and custom was not recognized officially, at the local level, 
Israeli officials orchestrated a certain level of legal pluralism that was informal and highly 
interventionist.  Bedouin law was not granted autonomy, nor recognized by ordinary 
governmental institutions such as courts and ministries.  However, pluralism and accommodation 
characterized the nature of the relations between Bedouins and those field officers who 
  Further 
evidence on accommodation of serious crimes comes from a comparison of the numbers of 
honor killings that reach courts in the first place.  In his survey of newspapers between 1973 and 
1977 for reports on honor killings, Gideon Kressel found thirty-eight cases within the Green Line, 
an average of 9.5 cases per year (Kressel 1992: 170).   During the past few years, Palestinian 
feminists have similarly reported approximately ten cases per year (Touma-Sliman 2005).  My 
archival research of all honor killing cases in the District Courts of Be’er Sheva and Nazareth 
between the years 1968 and 2005, revealed, however, that an average of 0.7 cases per year were 
tried in the two courts combined.  In the Negev, the discrepancy between actual number of cases 
and those that reached courts seems to be even higher.  In 38 years, a total of five cases of honor 
killings reached the Be’er Sheva District Court, of which two resulted in acquittal and one in a 
reduction of the charge to manslaughter.  The findings suggest strongly that many cases do not 
reach the level of courts and files are closed at the police level, or cases are recorded as suicide 
and accident, a point that has also been pressed by Palestinian feminists.  While it is difficult to 
quantify precisely the full extent to which Bedouins could take advantage of the “soft” 
administration of Israeli law to maintain their customary practices, one can surmise that 
Bedouins were often able to escape the severest sentences, and, occasionally, avoid punishment 
altogether. 
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specialized in Bedouin affairs.  These officials controlled much of the policy-implementation in 
relation to the Bedouin, such as who would be granted a land lease, who would be recognized as 
sheikh, and what portion of a legal dispute would be transferred over to the “official” legal level.  
This informal pluralism enabled the Israeli government to maintain the tribal structure of 
Bedouin society, if in reconstructed form, and its isolation from the rest of the Palestinian 
community.  It also provided a forum in which to gather intelligence about the internal divisions 
of Bedouin society and distribute resources selectively to secure certain policy goals.  Bedouins, 
in turn, handled their relations with the Israeli government almost exclusively through these field 
officers and did not resort to a broader discourse of citizenship or visit other offices of the state.  
The face-to-face relationships between Bedouin sheikhs and Israeli experts provided Bedouins 
with an avenue through which to access state resources, strike bargains with the Israeli 
government on matters of everyday concern, and preserve a modicum of cultural autonomy. 
The End of Military Rule, the Reemergence of the Land Question and the End of 
Folklore 
With the end of military rule, the Israeli government lost its previous leverage over the 
spatial and demographic control of the Bedouin population.  The permit regime had immobilized 
the Bedouins into the Enclosure Zone, holding them off from moving into spaces envisaged for 
Jewish settlement, and preventing them from initiating contacts with the rest of the Palestinian 
population.  The end of military rule in 1966 abolished these internal borders.  At the same time, 
the 1967 war brought new Palestinian populations—in the West Bank and Gaza Strip—under 
Israeli control.  Until the eruption of the intifada in 1987 and the Oslo Agreements of 1994, the 
borders with the Occupied Territories would also remain relatively permeable.  From the mid-
1960s on, therefore, Palestinian citizens of Israel gained a new mobility, which resulted in 
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increased contact with both one another and the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories.  In the 
Negev, the government’s response to this new mobility was to relocate Bedouins into permanent 
all-Bedouin urban settlements in areas determined by the government.  Many Bedouins did not 
want to move into the government-planned towns.  The tribal heritage of Bedouin society, 
moreover, played a fundamental role in their style of resistance to the government’s land and 
relocation policies.  As a result, the government’s perception of Bedouins as a quiescent 
population and the officials’ enthusiasm with Bedouins’ tribal ways was to give way to the 
identification of Bedouins as a “dangerous population” and an increasing emphasis on the need 
to “modernize” the Bedouin.  The rest of this article analyzes this transformation. 
The Planned Townships and Forced Urbanization 
In 1959, Prime Minister David Ben Gurion announced a five-year plan in which it was 
stated that the “government will bring down legislation to move down and concentrate the 
Bedouins into permanent settlements” (Yiftachel 2006: 200).  Seven townships were built for 
this purpose from 1965 until 1975: Rahat, Laqiya, Hura, Tel Sheva, Kusseifa, Aru’er, and Segev 
Shalom.  But the projected movement of the Bedouins into these townships did not materialize 
with the speed and ease the government expected.  Moving into the townships was made 
conditional on giving up all claims to ownership in the dispersed lands on which Bedouins lived.  
Already, Bedouins had begun to raise legal claims against the confiscations undertaken by the 
Israeli government in the 1950s and 1960s.  Bedouins tried to substantiate these claims with what 
tax documents they had from the periods of Ottoman and British rule and, when they failed to 
produce the necessary documents, arguing they had been in possession of these lands for 
generations.  Because of their historic reluctance to submit themselves to government regulations, 
Bedouins had avoided registering in their name the lands they held in possession during the 
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periods of Ottoman and British rule.   Therefore, when they began challenging the Israeli 
government’s extensive confiscation of their land in courts in the 1970s and 1980s, they had no 
land deeds at hand with which to substantiate their claims to ownership.  The collective memory 
and oral contracts that identified ownership and boundaries within Bedouin society had no 
standing, moreover, in Israeli courts.  Hence, Bedouins were not able to make much leeway in 
courts, where the conceptual order of government legality, which privileged official title deeds 
and Jewish ethos, prevailed over Bedouin understandings of ownership and justice (Shamir 1996; 
Shamir and Chinski 1998; Kedar 2002; Rosen-Zvi: 2004).  In 1979, there were 3,220 registered 
land claims between the Bedouin and the Israeli government (Falah 1989: 72).  According to 
Yiftachel, not one Arab has been awarded full ownership rights to date (Yiftachel 2006: 198-
199), and around 95 per cent of the legal claims, covering approximately eight hundred thousand 
dunams, wait to be settled (Yiftachel 2003: 33). 
While Bedouins could not win the legal battle on their opponent’s terms, they developed 
a different strategy of resistance that compelled Israel to meet them on their own grounds.  They 
refused to leave their lands and built tin shacks to stamp their presence, “creating facts on the 
ground,” in retaliation to the “facts” that Israel had created with the series of land laws enacted 
during 1950-1970.  By 1986, 5,944 “illegal Bedouin houses” had been built on these disputed 
lands (Falah 1989: 72).  All Bedouin settlements outside the townships were labeled 
“spontaneous” in contrast to “planned” in the government’s planning discourse, which 
juxtaposed the modernity and efficiency of the planned settlements to the unruliness and 
traditionalism of the dispersed settlements (Shamir 1996: 236).  The “spontaneous settlements,” 
which a later generation of activists redefined as “Unrecognized Villages,” grew into settlements 
of between 500 to 5,000 inhabitants and did not receive any public services.  The government’s 
 21 
strategy was to induce the Bedouin population to move to the planned townships by alluring 
them with subsidized plots of land and access to municipal resources such as water and 
electricity in the planned towns, while withholding all services from the Unrecognized Villages 
and threatening to demolish houses in these areas (Yiftachel 2006: 201).  In the background was 
the larger conflict over ownership of Negev lands.  As Bedouins refused to leave the spontaneous 
settlements in favor of the townships, government policy also turned more coercive and violent.  
Enforcement against spontaneous settlements began in the late 1980s following the 
recommendations of the Markovich Report, which envisaged the demolition of 6601 Bedouin 
constructions outside the planned towns (Shamir and Chinski 1998: 228; Greenspan 2005: 84-
85).  Around 1,300 such homes and structures were demolished from 1990 until 1998 (Negev 
Center 1999; Yiftachel 2006).  Despite the government’s heavy-handed approach, only about 
half of the Bedouin population moved into the townships while around 65,000-70,000 of them 
continue to live without basic services in more than 150 “spontaneous settlements” (Shamir 1996: 
236; Yiftachel 2006: 200). 
If Bedouins could not win against Israel in courts, their extralegal struggle—the stubborn 
refusal to move to the planned towns—proved highly effective.  In an interview to Ha’aretz in 
1998, Daniel Ben-Simon, a senior official in the Ministry of Agriculture described the impasse as 
“a declared and overt war” over land: “If we are not here, the Bedouin will be here…,and if, God 
forbid, we do not bring Jews to live here, within several years, we will lose the Negev” (quoted 
in Rosen-Zvi: 2004, 49).  Until the mid-1990s, Bedouins’ resistance to the relocation plan was 
spontaneous and unorganized.  They simply continued to build “spontaneous” settlements on 
“state land” and ignored the government’s demolition orders.  They did not link their struggle to 
the Palestinian national movement that had been emerging since the 1960s.  For instance, they 
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did not participate in Palestinian commemoration events such as Land Day or join Arab national 
organizations, despite their comparable experience of loss.  Nor did they vote in significant 
numbers for the anti-Zionist political parties such as Rakah (the Israeli Communist Party) and its 
successor Hadash, the Progressive Movement for Peace, or the National Democratic Alliance 
(Balad).  Indeed, many Bedouins resented being classified as part of a Palestinian “ethnic group” 
and drew on their own cultural traditions to resist the new order that the Israeli state imposed on 
them (Jakubowska 1992: 100).  In other words, Bedouins maintained the isolationism 
characteristic of their politics. 
While this form of resistance was spontaneous and unorganized, it was neither 
individualistic nor apolitical.  At the ideational level, it rested on a collective imagination 
according to which Bedouin history and tradition reigned supreme over the bureaucratic 
complications generated by Israeli legality.  In terms of political behavior, Bedouin resistance 
consisted of a series of everyday acts, such as building huts, ignoring demolition orders, and non-
committal interactions with Israeli officials, which Nathan Brown has described in a different 
context of rural resistance as “an unspoken and unorganized conspiracy” (Brown 1990: 77).  The 
collective nature of Bedouin resistance was embedded in everyday actions and tribal loyalty 
rather than organized opposition to Israeli policies.  The “conspiracy” was not lost on Israeli law 
enforcement officials, who perceived Bedouins as an intransigent community that undermined 
the authority of the state.  One officer noted, “The population doesn’t cooperate with the police 
full stop.”21  Another complained, “First of all, there is the problem of the mentality of Bedouin.  
They don’t like to deal with or cooperate with the police, or any authority in Israel, because they 
feel like second class citizens.”22 
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The conflict over land did much to damage the cordial relations between Bedouins and 
the Israeli government that had been built during the initial decades of statehood.  In response to 
a question about the contemporary problems in Bedouin society, a retired officer explained, 
Land is the number one issue. In the 1960s and 1970s, it was an 
economic problem originally. The question was what would be the 
level of compensation [offered to the Bedouin in exchange for their 
land]. Over the years, the clerks misled the state.  They said the 
Bedouin are friendly and they are not dangerous; nothing will 
happen if we don’t settle with them. But after 1967, both the state 
and the Bedouin changed their attitude. The state didn’t register 
their land … and the Bedouin were also afraid of losing the legal 
battle. They have claims over 750,000 dunams and they sit on 
about 400,000 dunams. After 1967, there is the Islamic movement 
and radicalization, so now it’s a political problem, no longer an 
economic problem.23
In this official’s mind, a sea-change had occurred in Bedouins’ relations with the state 
after 1967.  Bedouins were “unfriendly,” “dangerous,” “radical,” and “Islamic” to the extent they 
clung onto their land.  The refusal to give up land was seen, in other words, as a reversal of 
Bedouins’ loyalties to Israel and a sign of growing Palestinian nationalism: “They became 
nationalist over the years. At least 50 percent of them live outside the townships.”
 
24 Moreover, 
Israeli officials were wary of the thickening links between Bedouins and the rest of the 
Palestinian population, in particular, their growing attachment to the rising Islamic movement: 
“In the past, the Bedouin were religious but they were not ideological. Today, many of the 
Bedouin who are religious also adopt religion as an ideology. Until the year 1985, there wasn’t a 
single mosque in this area, but now, you can find a mosque in every quarter.”25  Bedouins’ 
stubborn resistance on the land question was blamed on these growing links with other sectors of 
the Palestinian population: “For example there are Palestinian commemoration days like the 
Land Day. Once, the Bedouins were indifferent about it. They were not part of it. Today they are, 
and they commemorate these things… They don’t accept the state of Israel as a democracy and 
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as a fact. They’re influenced by the Arab states and the Islamic movement.”26  Bedouins were 
thus seen increasingly as a “dangerous population.”  The tribal identity of the Bedouins, which 
Israeli officials tried hard to protect from contamination by other layers of identity during the 
military period, no longer seemed to reflect the beginning and end of their loyalties.  Instead, 
Bedouins were developing new attachments that did not displace, but complemented their tribal 
identity.  Bedouin experts understood this to be an “identity crisis” among the Bedouin, who 
were divided into “those who adhere to Palestinian-Arab identity,” “those who adhere to Israeli 
identity,” and “those who are in-between.”27
Other elements enter this crisis, such as the spread of Islamic 
ideology.  Another thing that worsens the identity crisis is that 
while Israeli Arabs have since 1948 declared themselves as 
Palestinian and developed an ideology, the Bedouin are very far 
from such conceptions and closer to Israeli identity. But about 
twenty years ago, Bedouins also started acknowledging Palestinian 
identity and the Islamic religion. They started consolidating 
solidarity with these movements. The Arabs are more developed 
than the Bedouins and they use the problems of the Bedouins to 
push their own interests. 
  The officer explained, 
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Being “modern,” went hand in hand with being “nationalist” and “threatening.”  According to 
the official, Bedouins had avoided these dangerous waters until recently but found themselves in 
an identity crisis as a result.  The “simple people who live in tents” and “don’t meddle in 
politics” were now being drawn into a bitter political conflict over land ownership by the more 
“modern” and sectors of Palestinian society. 
 
The growing perception of Bedouins as a threat also threw by the wayside the imagined 
history of peaceful relations and cooperation: “This identity problem is not a new creation.  For 
many years, the water was bubbling,” said one police officer.29  “The Bedouin hardly serve in 
the army.  There is perhaps 550 of them, it’s exaggerated that they serve in the army.  It’s 
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nothing, 550 people is nothing.  At any rate, they’re professional soldiers on the border, it’s not 
real service, it doesn’t mean that they’re loyal to the state.  It doesn’t mean that their national 
sentiments are with Israel.”30
In sum, the style of resistance that Bedouins developed from the 1970s on, fed on by their 
tribal heritage, and characterized by everyday acts of non-compliance, eroded Israeli officials’ 
faith in tribalism.  Bedouins were increasingly seen as a dangerous population, and a discourse of 
modernization replaced the earlier enthusiasm with Bedouin folklore.  In the next section, I 
examine how these changing perceptions were accompanied by an institutional transformation 
whereby expert government was superseded by the emergence of bureaucratic agencies that 
emphasized the “modernization” and “integration” of Bedouins. 
  Once a quiescent population whose loyalty was taken for granted, 
the Bedouins had come to be seen as a treacherous people that should never have been trusted in 
the first place. 
New Institutional Framework: From Folklore to Modernization/Integration 
In 1962, when the abolishment of military rule looked imminent, the Shin Bet prepared a 
report titled “Advice on How to Treat the Arab Minority.”  The report evaluated past policy and 
heralded the beginning of a new era in Israeli-Arab relations: 
The exclusive influence of the sheikhs-mukhtars has begun to 
diminish…; this development is inevitable, despite the possibilities 
[we have] of slowing down its stages, through our policy of 
communal and clan division and through other artificial means… 
over the last ten years, the policy of the government has been to 
divide the Arab population into communities and areas by 
harnessing interests to these two issues.  The sectarian policy and 
the clan division in the villages actively prevented the 
crystallization of the Arab population into one single entity… 
Today, it is no longer possible to control the Arab public through a 
small number of men. 
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The report continued that, at the beginning of 1960s, policy towards the Arabs 
reached a crossroads and [the authorities] must decide on which 
measures to take in order to slow down the process [of 
radicalization] which is bound to introduce security threats… Thus, 
the required conclusion is to aspire to a situation whereby the 
majority of the Arab population will be relieved as much as 
possible from pressing demands and feelings of dissatisfaction, on 
the one hand, and become integrated in the life of the state on the 
other hand, so as to minimize the danger of their self-
crystallization… Together with implementing the proposed policy 
[of integration], it is necessary to exhaust every possibility that the 
policy of sectarian [division] offers us which in the past has 
yielded fruit and succeeded in creating barriers—though 
sometimes artificial—between certain parts of the Arab population, 
such as the breakdown of the trust between the Druze community 
and the other Arab communities.  Since it was introduced, this 
policy has allowed us to prevent the Arab minority from coalescing 
into one united body by causing the leaders of each community to 
be preoccupied largely by sectarian affairs and not by general Arab 
affairs (quoted in Firro 1999: 179-180). 
The report heralded a gradual but comprehensive change, not only in policy, but also the 
institutional apparatus that had begun to emerge in the pre-state period and that came of age 
under Military Rule.  By the 1960s, Israeli officials had reached the conclusion that the policy of 
separating the Palestinian minority into isolated niches and controlling these niches through the 
cultivation of ties with family or tribal heads could not continue indefinitely.  While the urge to 
offset Palestinian nationalism would continue to be an overriding factor in the formulation of 
policy, an emphasis on socioeconomic modernization would increasingly underline the 
government’s approach, with the institutional balance of power shifting from the special 
minority offices and their expert staff towards the ministries distributing social services.  This 
shift encompassed the whole of the Palestinian population of Israel but took particular forms in 
the Negev, where the policy of governance through sheikhs had gone deeper than in other Arab 
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villages and where Bedouin resistance to Israeli policies took different paths from the emerging 
Palestinian national movement. 
A year after the Shin Bet’s report, in an interview with Ha’aretz, Moshe Dayan provided 
some clues on the implications of the new outlook on the Bedouin sector: 
We should transform the Bedouins into an urban proletariat—in 
industry, services, construction, and agriculture… Indeed, this will 
be a radical move which means that the Bedouin would not live on 
his land with his herds, but would become an urban person who 
comes home in the afternoon and puts his slippers on.  His children 
would be accustomed to a father who wears trousers, does not 
carry a Shabaria […] and does not search for vermin in public.  
The children would go to school with their hair properly combed.  
This would be a revolution, but it may be fixed within two 
generations.  Without coercion, but … this phenomenon of the 
Bedouins will disappear (Moshe Dayan, Ha’aretz interview, 31 
July 1963, quoted in Shamir, 1996: 231). 
While the informal legal pluralism described in the first section of this paper continues to 
characterize aspects of Bedouin-Israeli relations today, the commitment to maintaining the tribal 
structure of the Bedouins has lost much of its initial force and a concern with “modernization” 
and “integration” has gained salience.  This shift was triggered, I argue, by the style of resistance 
Bedouins developed against Israeli policies in the 1970s and 1980s, which drew on their tribal 
heritage.  The internal organization of the Bedouins, once a guarantee of Bedouins’ immunity to 
Palestinian nationalism and their loyalty to Israel, increasingly became problematic in Israeli 
officials’ eyes.  Government through experts was not suited to meet these challenges.  As a result, 
the institutional framework became more pluralized from mid-1970s on:  first, the government 
established new bureaucracies, such as the Bedouin Development Authority and the Bedouin 
Education Authority, with exclusive jurisdiction on the Bedouins, for the administration of a 
wide range of threats and rewards to induce the Bedouin to relocate into the urban townships.  
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Second, the service distributing ministries, such as the Ministries of Health, Education, Labor 
and Welfare came to play more important roles in the lives of Bedouin, as the government began 
to emphasize modernization and integration.  While Bedouin experts continue to hold key posts, 
they have lost their previous monopoly over policy making and implementation, and the face-to-
face interactions in which Bedouin-Israeli bargains were struck are increasingly replaced by the 
impersonal—albeit often discriminatory—administration of the bureaucracy. 
Special Institutions 
During the 1970s and 1980s, the Israeli government established new institutions with an 
exclusive jurisdiction over Bedouins to speed up the process of relocation into planned 
townships.  In 1976, a paramilitary agency was created within the Ministry of Agriculture with a 
mandate to police the illegal use of state lands and nature reserves.  This agency, the Green 
Patrol, operates as a coercive arm of the Israel Lands Authority to increase the pressure on 
Bedouins to move to the planned townships.  The Green Patrol confiscates Bedouin flocks that 
“encroach” into state lands and destroys crops and trees cultivated by Bedouins outside the 
planned townships (Abu Saad 2005: 132; Yiftachel 2006: 202).  In effect, the Green Patrol 
makes it nearly impossible to maintain a rural Bedouin life-style by cracking down on precisely 
those everyday acts of resistance that challenge Israeli authority.  In 1986, the Bedouin 
Development Authority (BDA) was established under the jurisdiction of Israel Lands 
Administration.  BDA controls much of the policy-making with respect to both planned 
townships and Unrecognized Villages.  While its initial purpose was to reach agreements on 
landownership, it controls the budgets for the planned townships that have municipal councils as 
well as water resources that are distributed selectively to the Unrecognized Villages (Abu Saad 
2005: 129-130).  The BDA exercises wide leverage over the distribution of resources that are 
 29 
vital for Bedouins on an everyday level and is the leading institution specializing on Bedouin 
affairs.  In 1981, the Bedouin Education Authority was established within the Ministry of 
Education to provide educational services in the Unrecognized Villages (Abu Saad: 2005 130-
131).  According to Abu Saad, the agency provides services selectively to reward loyal families 
and punish disloyal ones, enhancing the patronage relations characteristic of Bedouin-state 
interactions.  Together, the three institutions manipulate the allocation of threats and rewards to 
induce families in the Unrecognized Villages to move to the government planned townships. 
The Increasing Involvement of the Ministries 
As the government sought the “modernization” of the Bedouin via the policy of forced 
urbanization, the coercive approach of institutions related to the Israel Lands Authority was 
complemented by a more benign, “service” oriented approach.  The government’s desire to 
integrate the Bedouin through the distribution of modern social services, on the one hand, and a 
new form of activism challenging government discrimination against Unrecognized Villages in 
the field of social services, on the other, brought the service distributing ministries into the orbit 
of Bedouin governance. 
The government’s identification of “problem areas” in relation to the Bedouin reflects the 
growing concern with modernization.  A high ranking police officer summarized the problems of 
the Bedouin in the following order: identity crisis, natural growth, no leadership, differences in 
socioeconomic situation, problem of lands and illegal construction, crime, education, violent 
fights/conflicts, and the status of women.31  While “identity crisis” and “problem of lands and 
illegal construction” reflect Israel’s traditional concerns over Palestinian national identity and 
Jewish control of land, the interest in natural growth, leadership, divisions between fellaheen and 
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authentic Bedouin, education, and the status of women reflects a new concern with the tribal 
organization of Bedouin society.  The new priority of concerns reflects the government’s 
abandonment of its commitment to tribalism and an interest in modernizing and transforming the 
Bedouin through the social service agencies of the state.  Accordingly, the service distributing 
ministries, such as the Ministries of Health, Education, Labor and Welfare, have come to play 
important roles in the new structure of government.  These Ministries are now eager to reach out 
to Bedouins and provide them with services, although the welfare-dependency of Bedouins is 
also resented.  In particular, polygamy and high birth rate, which reflect Bedouins’ tribal heritage, 
are increasingly seen as problematic for generating a “predatory” community that lives on state 
welfare.  Bedouin co-wives who take advantage of the welfare benefits available for single 
mothers, for instance, are seen as abusing state resources.  The head of the Bedouin Education 
Authority, Moshe Shohat, summed up his disillusionment with the traditional practices of 
Bedouins by describing them as “a blood thirsty people who commit polygamy, have 30 children, 
and continue to expand their illegal settlements, taking over state land” (quoted in Raz and Atar 
2005: 42). 
The increasing involvement of the Ministries in Bedouin affairs has also been triggered 
by the activities of non-governmental organizations that took up the Bedouin cause from the 
mid-1990s on.  During these years, Bedouins developed links with Arab and Jewish human 
rights organizations and began to mount their claims in a more organized form of struggle.  The 
new civic activism brought international attention to the plight of the Bedouins in the 
Unrecognized Villages and pressured the government to improve social services to these 
communities.  In 1997, the inhabitants of the spontaneous settlements established the Regional 
Council for the Unrecognized Villages (RCUV) to negotiate the status of the spontaneous 
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settlements with the government (Abu Sa’ad 2005).  The RCUV called on the government to 
recognize the forty-five “unrecognized villages,” give them municipal status, and provide 
services to these areas (Greenspan 2005: 93).  More significantly, it called on the government to 
separate the question of land ownership from the question of movement into planned townships.  
In the same year, Dukium, the Negev Coexistence Forum for Civil Equality was established to 
promote collaboration between Jews and Bedouin sharing the Negev.  Dukium coordinated its 
activities with RCUV and engaged in awareness raising campaigns in Israel and at the 
international level.  In 2006, together with Physicians for Human Rights, RCUV and Dukium 
drafted a shadow report to the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination, where it criticized Israeli policies towards the Unrecognized Villages (Negev 
Coexistence Forum for Equality: 2006).  From the mid-1990s on, Israeli and Palestinian NGOs 
outside the Negev also began to take an interest in the Bedouin cause and some of Israel’s most 
prestigious human rights organizations, such as Adalah and the Association for Civil Rights in 
Israel (ACRI) set up branch offices in the Negev.32  In 1998 and 2003, Adalah, along with other 
international and Palestinian human rights organizations, submitted reports to the United Nations 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, where it devoted substantial attention to 
discrimination in the provision of social services to Bedouins.  The Israeli government’s 
treatment of Bedouins in the Unrecognized Villages was criticized severely by the Committee in 
its Concluding Observations in 1998 in response to Israel’s first periodic report (Economic and 
Social Council 1998).  In its second report in 2003, the Israeli government was pressured to 
discuss the situation of Bedouin villages at length, and the question of Unrecognized Villages 
was brought up again in the Committee’s Concluding Remarks (Economic and Social Council 
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2003).  In 2004, Israel officially recognized Darijat, one of the Unrecognized Villages (Yiftachel 
2006: 208). 
In the late 1990s and early 2000s, while mobilizing at the international level, Palestinian 
and Israeli human rights organizations also scored a number of victories in the Israeli Supreme 
Court in the area of social services to the Unrecognized Villages.  In 1998, a group of petitioners 
asked the Bedouin Education Authority to connect schools outside the planned townships to the 
electric grid.  The Supreme Court ruled that “The current situation in which Bedouin schools are 
not connected to electricity 50 years after the establishment of the State is unacceptable and 
speaks badly of Israel.”33  In 2000, the Supreme Court required the Minister of Health to 
establish primary care and mother-and-child clinics in the Unrecognized Villages.34  In 1998 and 
2000, in response to petitions filed by Adalah and RCUV, the Supreme Court ordered the 
Ministry of Labor and Welfare to assign additional welfare positions for the Unrecognized 
Villages.35
The human rights framework in which these claims were raised as well as the 
government’s new commitment to the modernization and integration of Bedouin forced various 
agencies of the state to “recognize” the Unrecognized Villages and deliver public services to 
these areas, while the Israel Lands Administration continues to look for ways to pressure the 
inhabitants of the Unrecognized Villages to move into the planned townships.  Ironically, the 
government’s commitment to modernization and integration, a discourse that developed in order 
to legitimize the forced relocation of Bedouins into government planned townships in the first 
place, eventually obliged the government to begin granting legality to the Unrecognized Villages 
  In Abu-Gardud v. Regional Council Ramat Ha-Negev, in 2000, the Court took 
judicial notice of the Ministry of Education’s promise to review planning process for establishing 
more schools and kindergartens in the unrecognized villages (Rosen-Zvi 2004: 72). 
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through service provision.  The human rights framework that the NGOs mobilized as a counter-
discourse undermined the government’s discourse of administrative efficiency that linked the 
provision of services to moving into the planned townships.  As the Ministries were drawn into 
the apparatus for governing the Bedouin, moreover, the institutional framework became more 
pluralized, eroding the monopoly of Bedouin experts in the implementation of policy and 
multiplying the arenas in which Bedouins and the Israeli government interact. 
Conclusion 
During the first two decades of Israel’s existence, Bedouins occupied a niche within 
Israel’s administrative practices.  Bedouins’ history of cooperation with Jewish officials before 
and during the 1947-1949 war, on the one hand, and the divide-and-rule policy Israel developed 
in order to preempt the emergence of a Palestinian national movement, on the other, converged 
to institutionalize a particular form of government over the Bedouins.  Bedouin affairs were 
handled almost exclusively through the informal relationships that Israeli “experts” cultivated 
with Bedouin sheikhs.  Law enforcement emerged as a site of complex governance, in which the 
experts administered the coexistence of Israeli law and Bedouin law, while gathering intelligence 
and accumulating knowledge about “Bedouin culture.”  While this form of legal pluralism was 
controlled and manipulated by the experts to secure certain policy goals, it also provided 
Bedouins with a space in which bargains could be struck on matters of everyday concern.  At the 
same time, Israel’s enthusiasm with Bedouin folklore and tribalism enabled Bedouins to 
maintain, if in reconstructed ways, the traditional legal and political structure of their society. 
After the end of military rule in 1966, the impasse over the question of ownership of 
Negev lands and Bedouins’ particular style of resistance to the relocation policies rendered the 
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tribal organization of Bedouins suspect.  The government’s interest in Bedouin folklore was 
increasingly replaced by a new discourse on modernization and integration.  Movement into the 
government planned townships was framed as a requisite of modernization and social welfare, 
and Bedouins’ tribal ways were now seen as obstructing their integration to Israeli society.  The 
discursive shift from folklore to modernization was accompanied by an institutional 
transformation, in which expert rule was overtaken by bureaucratic authority.  Unlike expert 
government of the 1950s and 1960s, the new institutional regime deemphasized face-to-face 
interactions and compromises in favor of impersonal administrative rule.  The replacement of 
face to face rule with these institutions enabled the government to carry out its often coercive 
policies within a discourse of modernization and efficiency.  At the same time, the pluralization 
of the institutional environment provided Bedouins with a more diverse array of venues through 
which to challenge Israeli policies. 
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